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ISSUE
What are the appropriate standards
for courts to follow in making a
determination to apply the mixed-
motive model to cases under Title
VII?
FACTS
Catharina Costa was employed as a
warehouse worker at Caesars Palace
Hotel & Casino from 1987 to 1994.
During her tenure she was disci-
plined on numerous occasions and
eventually terminated following a
fight with a co-worker.
The parties' characterization of
Costa's work history is substantially
different. Costa, the only female
employee in the warehouse, asserts
that her disciplinary record was the
result of discriminatory treatment:
she was reprimanded or suspended
for conduct that, when engaged in
by her male co-workers, was over-
looked. For example, she was issued
a written reprimand when she was
one minute late for work, whereas
men who were late for work were
given overtime to make up for the
lost wages. Moreover, she was sub-
jected to sexually harassing lan-
guage. Caesars, on the other hand,
attributes her disciplinary record to
her inability to get along with her
co-workers.
The fight that led to Costa's termi-
nation is similarly contested. Costa
claims she was confronted by a
male co-worker who shoved her
against the wall. She reported the
incident, but when she returned to
work, the co-worker "came at" her
again. The co-worker alleged that
Costa had pushed him. Caesars
states that since there were no wit-
nesses to the fight, it disciplined
both employees. Given Costa's disci-
plinary history, she was fired;
whereas the male co-worker, who
had 25 years of service and a rela-
tively clean disciplinary record,
received a five-day suspension.
Both employees grieved their disci-
pline, but an arbitrator upheld
(Continued on Page 426)
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FROM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Caesars's decision. Costa then filed
the present lawsuit against Caesars,
alleging sex discrimination in condi-
tions of employment and her termi-
nation in violation of Title VII.
After hearing the evidence, a jury
found in favor of Costa. Caesars
appealed the judgment to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming
the jury's verdict was based on erro-
neous jury instructions that misstat-
ed the law. Caesars argued that the
court mistakenly instructed the jury
to apply the mixed-motive model;
the correct instruction, according to
Caesars, would have been to apply
the pretext model. A panel of the
Ninth Circuit agreed and vacated
the judgment, remanding the case
to the district court. Costa v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.
2001).
Costa filed a motion with the Ninth
Circuit for rehearing en banc, which
was granted. The court held that the
jury instructions on mixed motive
were appropriate and that the dis-
trict court had not misstated the
law in giving those instructions.
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299
F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002).
Caesars filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, which the Supreme Court
granted. Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 123 S.Ct. 816, 154 L. Ed. 2d
766 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The disparate treatment theory for
proving sex discrimination under
Title VII requires that the plaintiff
prove she suffered an adverse
employment action because of her
sex. The "adverse employment
action" element of the plaintiffs
case is generally relatively easy to
prove: the employer's own employ-
ment records will show that the
plaintiff was, for example, fired or
disciplined. Much more difficult is
proving that this action was taken
"because of' the employee's sex. In
effect, the plaintiff is being asked to
prove what was in the employer's
mind at the time it took the adverse
action, i.e., the employer's motive.
Realizing the difficulty of proving
the employer's state of mind, the
Supreme Court, in a series of cases
beginning with McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), established a framework for
plaintiffs to utilize in establishing
illegal motive. Under McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence
that she is a member of the protect-
ed class and must eliminate the usu-
al reasons why an employer would
take the adverse action in con-
tention. For example, in a case
involving an employer's refusal to
hire the plaintiff, the plaintiff would
prove that she was a member of the
protected class (a woman), that she
applied for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants,
that she possessed the qualifications
for the job, and that she was not
hired and someone else was. These
last three factual elements eliminate
the most usual reasons why some-
one is not hired: the employer was
not hiring anyone, the plaintiff did
not ask to be hired, or the plaintiff
did not possess the skills required
for the job in question. Having elim-
inated the most usual reasons, the
McDonnell Douglas formulation cre-
ates a presumption that the reason
must have been based on the plain-
tiffs membership in the protected
class. What this means is that, if the
employer remains silent and pre-
sents no evidence, the fact-finder
must draw the conclusion from the
evidence presented that the employ-
er's refusal to hire was "because of'
the plaintiffs sex.
This presumption of illegal motive,
however, can be overcome if the
employer presents evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its action. The employer is
not required to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the
reason it presents is the real reason
for its action. For example, the per-
son responsible for hiring could tes-
tify that the plaintiff was not hired
because she received a bad recom-
mendation from her previous
employer. This testimony would be
sufficient to rebut the presumption
of discriminatory motive. The
employer does not have to convince
the fact-finder that the bad recom-
mendation was the reason.
At this stage of the case, the plain-
tiff is now required to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that
the employer's stated reason is a
pretext for a discriminatory motive.
If the plaintiff is not able to meet
this burden of proof, she loses the
case. The McDonnell Douglas for-
mulation is sometimes called the
pretext model, the single motive
model, or the indirect evidence/cir-
cumstantial evidence model for
proving disparate treatment
Sixteen years later, in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), the Court (in a plurality
decision) formulated an alternative
method for litigating a disparate
treatment case. Ann Hopkins had
been turned down for a partnership
at Price Waterhouse and sued under
Title VII, alleging sex discrimina-
tion. She produced evidence at trial
that the partner who explained the
reasons for the negative decision
told her that in order to improve
her chances for partnership, she
should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry."
The Court held that this evidence
did more than merely raise a pre-
sumption of discriminatory motive;
it directly proved what the employ-
er's motive was at the time the deci-
Issue No. 7
sion was made. Moreover, the plain-
tiff was not required to prove that
the discriminatory reason was the
sole reason for the employer's
action; it was sufficient if the plain-
tiff proved that discrimination was a
motivating factor. At this point the
burden of proof shifted to the
employer to prove that it would
have made the same decision even
if it hadn't taken sex into account.
Unlike in McDonnell Douglas, it
would not be enough for the
employer merely to produce evi-
dence that it would have made the
same decision; in Price Waterhouse,
the employer must convince the
fact-finder by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have
made the same decision. In other
words, the burden of proof has shift-
ed to the employer. If the employer
is successful in carrying this burden
of proof it wins the case-there is
no violation of Title VII and no lia-
bility accrues.
In a concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connor elucidated on her
understanding of this alternative
method. In particular, she noted
that "in order to justify shifting the
burden on the issue of causation
to the defendant, a disparate treat-
ment plaintiff must show by direct
evidence that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor
in the decision."
The Price Waterhouse formulation
is sometimes referred to as the
mixed-motive model or the direct
evidence model for proving dis-
parate treatment.
Two years later, as part of the Civil
Rights Act (CRA) of 1991, Congress
modified the effect of the Court's
holding in Price Waterhouse.
Section 703(m) provides that once a
plaintiff proves that sex was a moti-
vating factor for an employment
decision, Title VII is violated, even if
other factors also motivated the
decision. Thus, even if the employer
proves it would have made the same
decision, it has still violated Title
VII by virtue of the fact that a pro-
hibited factor, such as sex, was a
motivating factor in the decision.
Section 706(g)(2)(B) mitigates the
effect of this violation, however, by
limiting the liability of the employ-
er. If the employer proves it would
have taken the same decision, a
court may still grant injunctive
relief and award costs and attor-
neys' fees against the employer,
but a court cannot award damages
or order hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion.
For purposes of the present case,
the key difference between the
McDonnell Douglas model and the
Price Waterhouse model relates to
the nature of the employer's burden.
Under McDonnell Douglas, an
employer has merely a burden of
production of evidence regarding
the reason for its employment
decision; under Price Waterhouse,
the employer must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence
that it would have made the same
decision based on factors other
than the prohibited classification.
The placement of the burden of
proof can, in many cases, be
outcome determinative.
In the present case, the district
court's jury instructions were based
on the Price Waterhouse mixed-
motive model of the disparate treat-
ment theory. The Ninth Circuit's en
banc decision upheld those instruc-
tions. In so doing, it reasoned that
the "single-motive" and "mixed-
motive" cases are not different cate-
gories of cases. Both require the
employee to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the
employer acted with discriminatory
motive. The court noted that the
1991 CRA amendments to Title VII
abrogated Justice O'Connor's com-
ments regarding the need for "direct
evidence that an illegitimate criteri-
on was a substantial factor in the
decision." Instead § 703(m) requires
proof of only a motivating factor and
does not impose any special or
heightened evidentiary proof burden
on the plaintiff. Under § 703(m),
once the plaintiff proves by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence
(whether that evidence is direct or
circumstantial) that sex played a
motivating factor in the employ-
ment decision, she has proven a vio-
lation of Title VII.
Caesars argues that the Ninth
Circuit fundamentally misunder-
stood the effect of the 1991 CRA on
the Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse. Initially, Caesars notes
that the actual holding of the Court
in Price Waterhouse (a plurality
opinion) is found in the opinion of
Justice O'Connor. When no single
opinion is supported by five jus-
tices, the holding of the Court is
based on the position taken by the
justice(s) who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds.
According to Caesars, that position
is the one espoused by Justice
O'Connor. Thus, Price Waterhouse
allows for the shifting of the burden
of proof to the employer on the
issue of motive only when the
plaintiff meets a high evidentiary
standard based on direct evidence
of discrimination.
The CRA did not disturb that
requirement of a higher evidentiary
standard. It was instead aimed at
that portion of the decision that
allowed the employer to avoid both
a finding of a violation and all liabil-
ity by proving it would have made
the same decision based on other
factors. Indeed, most of the circuits
that have considered this issue have
ruled that a plaintiff can prevail
under a mixed-motive theory only if
she presents "direct evidence that
decisionmakers placed substantial
(Continued on Page 428)
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negative reliance on an illegitimate
criterion."
Caesars also asserts that failure to
retain the direct evidence standard
would result in shifting the burden
of proof to the employer in most
discrimination cases, contrary to
both the plurality and concurrence
in Price Waterhouse. These opin-
ions noted the continued viability of
the McDonnell Douglas framework
as applying to most employment
discrimination claims. Under the
Ninth Circuit approach, however,
plaintiffs will have an incentive to
opt for mixed-motive instructions in
almost every case, circumventing
McDonnell Douglas.
Shifting the burden to the employer
can only be justified when there is
direct evidence that race, sex, reli-
gion, national origin, or color consti-
tuted a substantial factor in the
decision-making process. Such
direct evidence has been strictly
defined by most circuit courts as
requiring statements made by the
decisionmaker that directly reflect
discriminatory animus and relate
directly to the contested employ-
ment decision. In the absence of a
strict definition of direct evidence,
mixed-motive instructions will
inherently prejudice the jury to find
in favor of the employee.
Maintenance of the direct evidence
standard appropriately balances the
rights of both employers and
employees.
Caesars concludes that since the
evidence presented by Costa in this
case did not meet the higher stan-
dard for direct evidence, the use of
the mixed-motive jury instruction
was reversible error.
The solicitor general, in an amicus
brief for the United States in sup-
port of Caesars's position, adduces
additional arguments. He asserts
that not only Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Price Waterhouse,
but also the plurality opinion and
Justice White's concurrence, require
that the mixed-motive plaintiff bear
a heightened burden of proof requir-
ing her to present evidence that the
discriminatory motive played a sub-
stantial role in the employer's deci-
sion. Until the Ninth Circuit opinion
in this case, all the courts of appeals
had also required plaintiffs to pre-
sent direct evidence that discrimi-
nation was a substantial motivating
factor.
The government notes, however,
that the courts are divided over
what type of evidence constitutes
such direct evidence. Some courts
require that the evidence must
prove the fact of discriminatory
motive without inference or pre-
sumption. Other courts allow the
use of either circumstantial or
direct evidence to establish intent.
The government argues that the
requirement of noninferential evi-
dence most closely comports with
the Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse.
Moreover, the government says, §
703(m) was meant to apply only to
mixed-motive cases. It was not
intended to apply to all Title VII
cases. It does not eliminate the dis-
tinctions between pretext and
mixed-motive cases or the direct
evidence requirement that distin-
guishes the latter from the former.
Finally, the government argues that
both the text and legislative history
of the 1991 CRA clearly indicate
that Congress intended only to over-
rule that aspect of the Price
Waterhouse decision relating to the
employer's liability. It did not alter
the direct evidence standard for
determining the applicability of the
mixed-motive model.
Costa, in her brief, directs the
Court's attention to the language of
§ 703(m). Nowhere in the text of
the statute is there a requirement
that the plaintiff offer direct evi-
dence. It merely requires the plain-
tiff to "demonstrate[] that race, col-
or, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor. ..." The
term "demonstrate" is specifically
defined in § 701(m) of Title VII as
meaning to "meet[] the burdens of
production and persuasion." The
statute does not require that those
burdens be met with any particular
kind of evidence. A plaintiff who
proves by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of discrimi-
natory intent as a motivating factor
has satisfied the statutory require-
ment regardless of the type of
evidence produced.
Costa points out that when
Congress wishes to create a height-
ened burden of proof, it explicitly
states its intent. There are numer-
ous examples throughout the U.S.
Code of express provisions requiring
that facts be proven "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" or by "clear and
convincing evidence." Nowhere in
the Code, however, is direct evi-
dence required. Indeed, the only
reference to direct evidence is in
federal statutes providing that such
evidence is not required.
According to Costa, the suggestion
in the government's brief that a
plaintiff must prove that sex or race
was a substantial motivating factor
is mistaken. While the Court's deci-
sion in Price Waterhouse can fairly
be read to contain such a standard,
there is no such requirement con-
tained in § 703(m). The statute
itself requires proof only that illegal
intent was a motivating factor.
Costa also disagrees with Caesars's
assertion that the holding of Price
Waterhouse imposed a direct evi-
dence requirement. That require-
ment is found only in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, but her
Issue No. 7428
opinion is not needed in order to
form the holding of the case. Rather,
Justice White's concurrence, which
contains no reference to direct evi-
dence, together with the plurality
opinion, creates the holding of the
case. The plurality opinion dis-
avowed any limitation on the type
of evidence that the plaintiff must
produce in a mixed-motive case.
Applying § 703(m) as written, with-
out engrafting a direct evidence
requirement, does not conflict with,
nor abnegate, the McDonnell
Douglas model. In all disparate
treatment cases, regardless of the
model used, a plaintiff has the bur-
den of proof on the issue of discrim-
inatory motive. McDonnell Douglas
merely provides one method by
which a plaintiff may establish such
a motive. Section 703(m), on the
other hand, addresses the issue of
allocating the burden of proof
regarding causation once the plain-
tiff has carried its burden of proof
on motive.
Costa argues that contrary to
Caesars's assertion, upholding the
Ninth Circuit's decision will not
result in applying the mixed-motive
model to almost every case. The
burden of proof does not shift to the
employer merely because the plain-
tiff has created a presumption of
discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas. Such a shift occurs only
when the plaintiff has proven the
illegal motive by a preponderance of
the evidence.
The direct evidence requirement
proposed by Caesars and the gov-
ernment is neither clear nor work-
able, Costa contends. As the govern-
ment itself noted, the lower courts
have not agreed on what constitutes
direct evidence. Indeed, a number
of circuits have defined direct evi-
dence as including any type of evi-
dence, whether circumstantial or
direct. Defining direct evidence as
limited to noninferential testimony
in effect means the only direct evi-
dence of discriminatory motive
would be the testimony of the deci-
sionmaker himself that he made the
employment decision because of the
plaintiffs sex or race. Such testimo-
ny would never be available.
In addition, Costa argues, the stan-
dard of direct evidence proposed by
Caesars (i.e., statements directly
reflecting discriminatory animus
made by the decisionmaker related
directly to the employment deci-
sion) is inherently ambiguous,
thereby posing practical problems in
application. Determining who the
actual decisionmaker is (the person
with defacto influence as opposed
to de jure job title), what types of
statements constitute direct reflec-
tions of animus relating to the
employment decision, and how
close in time the statement must
be to the decision all present
definitional problems.
Finally, Costa notes that in no other
area of law do courts make a dis-
tinction between direct and circum-
stantial evidence for purposes of
proving contested facts. There is no
rational reason to impose such a
distinction for Title VII cases.
In this case, Costa reasons, she pre-
sented sufficient evidence to prove
that sex was a motivating factor in
the decision to terminate her. Thus
the decision of the Ninth Circuit
upholding the jury instruction
should be affirmed.
SIGNIFICANCE
While seemingly presenting a nar-
row technical issue regarding evi-
dentiary standards, this case will
have widespread impact on Title VII
litigation, a category of civil cases
that constitutes a good percentage
of the federal court docket. If the
Court adopts Caesars's position and
engrafts a direct evidence require-
ment onto § 703(m), it will signifi-
cantly limit plaintiffs' ability to pur-
sue their claims under the mixed-
motive model. The evidence neces-
sary to meet this heightened stan-
dard would be available in a very
limited number of cases. This, in
turn, will limit the occasions when
employers will have to bear the bur-
den of proving that the employment
decision would have been the same
without regard to the plaintiffs' sex
or race.
Conversely, applying the usual civil
litigation standard of preponderance
of the evidence to § 703(m) makes
the mixed-motive model available to
more plaintiffs, increasing their
chances for recovery on their
claims. Once a plaintiff has proven,
by whatever means, that sex was a
motivating factor in an adverse
employment decision, the employer
will be required to justify that deci-
sion by proving it would have
reached the same decision regard-
less of the plaintiffs sex. Failure to
meet that burden will result in a full
recovery for plaintiff, but even if the
employer meets its burden, it would
still be liable for plaintiff's costs and
attorney's fees, as well as injunctive
relief.
As previously noted, the allocation
of the burden of proof can, in many
cases, be outcome determinative.
(Continued on Page 430)
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